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Abstract 
Why are legislative proposals closer to the positions of some organized interests than of others? The 
literature proposes that policy-makers are attentive to the demands of lobbyists that provide relevant 
information. At the same time, being part of a policy community is also claimed to enable lobbyists 
to shape policy formulation. We argue that both factors reinforce each other: Informational resources 
are particularly effective in reducing the gap between the Commission’s policy position and the 
position of lobbyists if both actors are part of the same policy community. Analysing data on over 
100 policy issues in the European Union, we find that the context of a friendly Directorate-General 
reinforces the effectiveness of lobbyists’ informational resources. However, on its own, a context of 
friendly relations between the policy-maker and the lobbyist contributes little to explaining why the 
European Commission’s policy position is closer to some actors than to others.  
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The political success of organized interests is widely considered to depend on their capacity to 
provide helpful information: Lobbyists that can offer high-quality information to policy-makers 
should be most successful in gaining access and shaping policy outcomes (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-
Smith 1993; Lohmann 1993). At the same time, favourable context conditions, such as a policy 
community encompassing the policy-maker and lobbyist, are seen as a prerequisite for successful 
lobbying (Knoke et al. 1996; Marsh 1998; Vogel 1989). Interest groups that face policy-makers who 
are favourably predisposed to them will find it easier to exert influence (Richardson and Jordan 
1979; Marsh 1998, Marshall 2010). Yet to date, the relationship between informational factors and 
context conditions remains unclear: What is the relative importance of these two factors in interest 
group politics? And how, if at all, do they interact in shaping the extent to which groups can achieve 
their desired policy outcomes?  
 
We argue that the ability to provide relevant information (i.e. information that can help a policy-
maker assess the likely consequences of a planned policy change) is the primary factor explaining 
how close legislative proposals are to the policy positions of lobbyists. However, we also contend 
that the effectiveness of lobbyists’ informational capacities is affected by the institutional context: 
the ability to offer relevant information may be ineffective if a group faces hostile political decision-
makers. Facing friendly policy-makers, in turn, should help those interest groups that can offer 
relevant information. It is therefore important to analyse how the combination of information and 
context accounts for the ability of interest groups to shape policy formulation. 
 
To investigate this question we focus on the distance between the policy positions of organized 
interests and the European Commission at the policy formulation stage of the EU legislative process. 
It is widely recognized that lobbyists are well advised to get involved before a policy gets to the 
stage of public controversy (Dunleavy 1991) or becomes subject to plenary parliamentary debates 
(Austen-Smith 1993; Schlozman and Tierney 1986) and ideally even before specific policy 
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instruments and documents are formulated (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Bouwen 2009: 25-6). 
Indeed, the degree of positional proximity has major implications for the output of the European 
policy process: Lobbyists who manage to shape policy early on find their preferences much better 
reflected in the resulting legislation (Dür et al. 2015). However, existing analyses of lobbying tend to 
focus on the decision-making stage of the policy process. Only recently have scholars begun to 
investigate systematically the role of organized interests at the policy formulation stage of the EU 
policy process (Bunea 2013; Klüver 2013). 
 
In the following sections, we first develop a theoretical account of the role of information and 
institutional context in early stage lobbying in the EU and derive hypotheses. We then introduce the 
data used for testing these hypotheses before proceeding to present our findings. These data capture 
lobbying on over 100 policy issues in the EU. We conclude by relating our results to the literatures 
on lobbying and on public policymaking in the EU. 
 
EXPLAINING POSITIONAL PROXIMITY BETWEEN POLICY-MAKERS AND 
LOBBYISTS 
Lobbying is most effective when applied at the policy formulation stage (Austen-Smith 1993; 
(Dunleavy 1991; Bouwen 2009). In the EU, policy formulation is mainly the task of the European 
Commission. The Commission is the main agenda setter for the EU’s legislative activity and it has 
the prerogative of initiating and drafting legislative proposals. The political preferences of interest 
groups can enter the Commission’s proposals in two ways: The Commission can listen to the 
lobbyists that possess a high level of policy-relevant knowledge, or it can listen to the groups with 
whom it shares broader political beliefs irrespective of their knowledge levels. We call these the 
informational argument and the context argument. In the following, we first develop these two 
expectations and then describe how the two factors reinforce each other.  
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The information argument starts with the assumption that political lobbying consists primarily in 
transmitting information to policy-makers. Policy-makers need the information that societal groups 
provide to translate their political goals effectively into outcomes (Austen-Smith 1993; Ainsworth 
1993; Lohmann 1993). Importantly, information and expertise enable organized interests to shape 
policy-makers’ beliefs about which of various policy choices would lead to desired outcomes and 
which would not – or even have unwanted and harmful consequences. The European Commission 
has an additional reason to listen to interest groups that possess high-quality information. Like other 
agenda setting agencies, it seeks to formulate policy proposals that will successfully pass the 
subsequent legislative process (Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Moravcsik 
1999). For its policy proposals to become legislation, they have to be approved by the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). In order to produce such policies, the Commission 
needs policy-relevant information from societal actors represented by national and European-level 
interest organizations (Crombez 2002; Klüver 2013). The Commission therefore consults with 
interest groups to maximize the subsequent success of its policy proposals (Bouwen 2002; Klüver 
2013; McLaughlin, Jordan and Maloney 1993). 
 
When there is conflict among groups over policy, the Commission’s draft proposals will be closer to 
the political position of some interest groups than of others. In the process of policy formulation, the 
policy proposal represents the Commission’s policy position (which may or may not be identical 
with its preferences). Because of the two reasons presented above, the informational argument 
suggests that, in such cases, the Commission’s policy proposals resemble an interest group’s position 
more closely the more relevant information the group can bring to the consultation and lobbying 
process. Thus, we expect that 
 
H1a: The distance between a lobbyist’s position and the Commission position decreases with the 
level of relevant information the lobbyist commands. 
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In the EU as elsewhere, much lobbying is embedded in coalitions of actors sharing positions and 
pursuing common political goals. These may be coalitions based on formal organizational ties 
(Mizruchi and König 1991; Hula 1999), ad hoc coalitions involving a degree of coordination 
(Pijnenburg 1998) or simply ‘sides’ of lobbyists, defined as a subset of actors who share the same 
policy goal (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Heinz et al. 1993; Klüver 2013).1 For our analysis it is 
important to take these sides of actors into account: Actors availing of little or poor information may 
find the distance between the Commission’s position and their own reduced because another actor on 
the same side can offer relevant information to the Commission. Thus, we should expect that 
information provided by issue-specific sides of lobbyists pulling the policy-maker in the same 
direction accounts for some of the variation in proximity between the Commission and an individual 
lobbyist. To incorporate this dimension into our analysis, we define ‘side’ as a group of lobbyists 
holding similar or close positions on a specific issue. According to these considerations, we expect 
that 
 
H1b: The distance between a lobbyist’s position and the Commission position decreases with the 
level of relevant information the lobbyist’s side commands. 
 
The extent to which policy-makers respond to lobbying may also depend on the institutional context 
(Dür and De Bièvre 2007). The context argument starts with the insight that different policymaking 
venues are more favourable to some organized interests than to others and that groups adjust their 
strategies accordingly (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In the case of EU policy formulation, regular 
interactions are maintained between specific interest groups and the Directorates-General (DGs) 
dealing with policies affecting these groups. This happens for two reasons: Firstly, because organized 
interests attempt to seek out the most relevant policy-makers for the pursuit of their political 
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interests, and secondly, because the Commission seeks contact with selected organized interests in its 
search for policy information and legitimacy (cf. Bouwen 2002). 
 
As a result, policy communities have formed around individual DGs (Dudley and Richardson 1999; 
Peterson 1995, Coen 2007). Business interests are more likely to maintain contacts with DG 
Enterprise and Industry while DG Environment is more likely to liaise with environmental groups 
(Bouwen 2009, 24). Consequently, while DGs and their staff may pursue their own preferences 
concerning policy, they are also imbedded in policy communities that include interest groups. DGs 
therefore constitute important institutional factors that must be taken into account when analyzing 
lobbying and policy-making (cf. Klüver et al. 2014 in this special issue). These communities involve 
a limited number of participants that share similar ideologies and values and engage in frequent and 
high quality interaction (cf. Richardson and Jordan 1979). Thus, when policy-makers look for input 
when formulating policies, they are likely to give particular attention to lobbyists who share their 
broader political outlook and belief system (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Lobbyists, in turn, 
can be thought of as dealing with a friendly policy-maker. As in many political systems, including 
the EU, policy formulation frequently involves cooperation across different policy units under the 
lead of one. But it is the relationships with the department leading the policy formulation task that 
usually matter most. Thus, we hypothesize that 
 
H2a: The distance between a lobbyist’s position and the Commission position is smaller if the 
lobbyist faces a friendly lead DG. 
 
Once again, we expect to make a similar observation if the side of the lobbyist is dealing with a 
friendly DG. 
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H2b: The distance between a lobbyist’s position and the Commission position is smaller if the 
lobbyist’s side faces a friendly lead DG. 
 
So far we have discussed separately how the proximity of policy positions between lobbyists and the 
policy-maker is affected by lobbyist’s information resources and by their relationship with the 
policy-maker. But the extent to which the policy process is shaped by information asymmetries 
between organized interests and policy-makers is itself likely to vary with the institutional context. 
The reason for this is that the quality and utility of information provided by interest groups can only 
be assessed retrospectively. Hansen (1991) has demonstrated that this leads policy-makers to restrict 
access to those groups with whom they expect to have repeated interactions in the future. In the EU’s 
system of ‘élite pluralism’ (Coen 1997), numerous points of access to the policy process mean that 
policy-makers are exposed to different lobby messages from numerous sources. Yet, while policy-
makers may thus listen to different actors they will be careful when using the received information in 
policy formulation. EU Commission staff should rely more heavily on information received from 
lobbyists sharing their broader political beliefs relative to information provided by other lobbyists. 
Therefore, we extend the logic underpinning Hansen’s argument to contend that policy-makers’ 
restricted capacity to verify the utility of information supplied by lobbyists also constrains the extent 
to which the information that is received is put to use. In other words, the policy-maker’s information 
problems bias not only their openness to information supplied by established actors but also the 
extent to which they translate received information into policy.  
 
In the EU, DGs form closer relationships with interest organizations that provide relevant and 
reliable information over time (Coen and Katsaitis 2013; Broscheid and Coen 2003). This implies 
that organized interests are better positioned to bring their information and expertise to bear on the 
formulation of policy proposals when interacting with ‘friendly’ agenda setters. As a result, relevant 
information held by organized interests is more effective in bringing the Commission position closer 
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to the lobbyist’s position if the group in question is dealing with a friendly DG. At the same time, 
lobbyists might find that the information they provide is used more explicitly or openly by the 
Commission DG because their position is close to that of the DG. As Boswell (2008) suggests, there 
might be an instrumental use of policy knowledge within the Commission, with policy-makers 
selectively drawing from the pool of expertise in order to legitimize or validate their existing policy 
positions. Similarly, Broscheid and Coen (2003) and Coen and Katsaitis (2013) have argued that EU 
policy-makers encourage access from groups they perceive  to  provide  the  type  of  information  
that  helps  to  legitimize  the policy they favour already. Once again, this logic might apply to sides 
of lobbyists as much as to individual actors. Thus, we expect that 
 
H3a: Increases in the lobbyist’s information level reduce the distance between the lobbyist’s position 
and the Commission position if the lobbyist faces a friendly lead DG. 
 
And  
 
H3b: Increases in the lobbyist’s information level reduce the distance between the lobbyist’s position 
and the Commission position if the lobbyist’s side faces a friendly lead DG. 
 
DATA, MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
To evaluate the theoretical claims formulated in the previous section, we employ several approaches 
to data collection. The starting point for the analysis is the INTEREURO random sample of 125 
legislative proposals, adopted by the European Commission between 1st January 2008 and 31st 
December 2010.2 This period was selected to be both recent enough for interviewees to be 
accessible, while increasing the chances that at the time of the interview the legislative process 
would have concluded. The sample is confined to regulations and directives as they share a number 
of decision-making features that allow meaningful comparisons across proposals. This consideration 
9 
 
necessitated separate sampling, as a simple random approach would have led to the inclusion of very 
few directives. To reduce the likelihood of capturing purely administrative cases or too many on 
which lobbying activity was highly unlikely, the sample was quantified to contain a minimum 
amount of publically salient issues. Salience is operationalized as media coverage in at least two of 
five leading pan-European and national newspapers: Agence Europe, European Voice, the Financial 
Times, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Le Monde.3  
 
As the focus of interest group representation at the consultation stage, the Commission is uniquely 
placed to provide information on the range of actors playing a prominent role in the policy process. 
On the basis of the sample, interviews were conducted with Commission officials that had direct 
responsibility for preparing a proposal from its consultation phase onwards. The initial step was to 
identify the lead DG via the Prelex database and from there track down the current whereabouts of 
the official in question. Information was provided for 70 legislative proposals (44 directives and 26 
regulations), which between them represent the theoretically important variation of the sample.4 
Following the approach pioneered by Thomson et al. (2006), the relevant Commission expert for 
each proposal was asked to identify the unidimensional issue(s) that had attracted controversy 
between stakeholders.5 This is a necessary step to establish actor positions as well as to make 
meaningful comparisons between issues. In total, the respondents identified 112 issues, with the 
distribution ranging from one to four issues per proposal. There is no evidence to suggest that 
officials misrepresent issues, but we nevertheless undertook steps to validate their recollections. This 
involved locating all available interest group consultation submissions. Two researchers identified 
and recorded all policy issues; afterwards they compared their findings with the issues identified by 
the Commission officials. A third coder resolved the 16 disparities. In total 173 documents were 
analysed, encompassing 31 proposals (44 per cent of sample), enabling us to assess the validity of 50 
of the 112 identified issues. The result was encouraging: 49 (98%) of the policy issues identified in 
the interviews were also prominent within the written submissions.  
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Through the Commission interviews, we were able to establish for each issue a list of the more 
prominent and active organized interests. In total, 1,043 non-state advocates were identified, with a 
mean of 9.8 actors per issue.6 There was considerable variation across the 16 DGs, with the number 
of groups ranging from 4 to 321.7 The officials then estimated the relative policy positions for each 
interest group that they identified as active on a given issue, as well as for institutional actors 
including the Council, EP majorities, and the Commission. These were placed along a 
unidimensional issue continuum with a range of 0-100, where zero means least support for EU 
regulation and higher values indicate support for more regulation. 
 
The dependent variable is distance to the Commission. This is an absolute measure of the distance 
between a lobbyist’s ideal policy position and that of the Commission. It is derived from the 
positional data of actors placed along each of the 112 issue continua. The variable has a trimodal 
distribution, with a large number of values around 0, 50 and 100.8 This reflects the fact that the 
Commission often adopts positions at these values (in 12 percent of the cases a position between 0 
and 5; in 16 percent between 45 and 55; and in 30 percent between 95 and 100). In Figure 1, we 
show the average distance to the Commission per DG with primary responsibility. The distance 
clearly varies across DGs, with some (e.g. DG Justice, Freedom & Security) positioned much more 
closely to interest groups than others (e.g. DG Trade). To assess the validity of the Commission 
officials’ positional estimates, we made a further comparison with the consultation documents. To 
minimize coding error, given the complexity of the narratives, the issue continuum was simplified to 
a three-point scale (0, 50, 100). Two researchers located and compared 263 policy positions found 
within a corresponding set of 173 written submissions. The level of agreement between the official’s 
recollection and the positions expressed in the consultation documents was high, with a 
Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.88 [CI: 0.84, 0.94] providing considerable confidence in the officials’ 
estimates.  
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 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
To gauge the extent to which organized interests command relevant policy information, each 
Commission official was asked to assess ‘the level of technical knowledge each organisation holds 
with respect to this policy proposal’. Using a five-point scale, with ‘0’ indicating very low and ‘4’ 
very high, levels of policy-relevant knowledge (IG knowledge) were estimated by the Commission 
official for 939 groups. 45 percent of all actors in our dataset were coded 4 on this variable, 24 
percent were coded 3 and 31 percent were coded 2 or lower. We have confidence in the 
Commission’s estimates, particularly given the encouraging results from the aforementioned 
comparisons with exogenous information sources. In the analysis below, we use this variable, firstly, 
at the level of individual interest group and, secondly, as an aggregate knowledge measure for each 
side on an issue. To arrive at the side variable, we assign each side of an issue the maximum value on 
IG knowledge estimated for a member of that side (IG knowledge (side)). In other words, a lobbying 
side is assumed to claim the knowledge of its best informed member. We identify sides as all actors 
that are within a range of +/- 10 points on the issue continuum that ranges from 0-100. To illustrate, 
the side of an actor located at 20 encompasses all actors with a position between 10 and 30. We 
chose this operationalization of sides to avoid fixed cut-off points along the issue continuum creating 
artificial breaks. For example, opting for two sides, one to the left and the other to the right of 50, 
would mean that an actor located at 49 forms part of the same side as an actor at 0; but finds herself 
on opposite sides to an actor at 51. 
 
The classification of the relationship between types of organised interest and each of the 16 DGs as 
friendly or unfriendly proved to be remarkably clear cut, in particular to those involved in EU policy 
making. Hence there was full coding agreement amongst a panel of five experienced EU officials 
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(outside of the Commission) and academic researchers. From these expert categorisations we created 
a dummy variable Friendly DG that is coded 1 if the lobbyist is: 
 
a. a business actor and the lead DG is Trade, Energy & Transport, Internal Market & Services, 
Economic & Financial Affairs, Enterprise & Industry, or Taxation & Customs Union; 
b. an environmental group and the lead DG is Environment; 
c. a health or consumer group and the lead DG is Health & Consumer Protection;  
d. a labour union and the lead DG is Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities;  
e. an agricultural association and the lead DG is Agriculture & Rural Development; or 
f. a fisheries association and the lead DG is Maritime Affairs & Fisheries.  
 
All other group-DG dyads are coded ‘0’. Applying these rules, 570 groups were coded 0; 473 groups 
were coded 1.9 We also calculated a ‘Friendly DG’ variable for each side of lobbyists. We do so by 
calculating the share of actors on one side that faces a friendly DG (friendly DG (side)).10 Summary 
statistics for all variables are provided in Table A-1 in the online appendix. 
 
To approximate the ceteris paribus condition, the multivariate analysis that follows uses a number of 
control variables. We include a nominal variable – regulation – to capture the use of this legal 
instrument in contrast to directives. To take account of the possible effect that the sheer number of 
actors aligning with any one particular actor may have on the results, we control for the size of 
lobbying side, where sides are defined as above. Furthermore, it is possible that high levels of public 
attention may diminish the advantage of lobbying ‘friendly’ policy-makers (Schattschneider 1960; 
Danielian and Page 1994). Therefore, we control for the possible effects of media attention by 
counting the number of times each of the 70 proposals is mentioned across the five aforementioned 
media sources. As the effect of media attention should be marginally decreasing, we use the natural 
log of that number. The institutional context is highly correlated with group type: 88 per cent of the 
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actors that are coded as facing a friendly DG are firms or business associations.11 This variable may 
therefore capture the effect of group type as much as, or more than, the friendliness of DGs, a 
possibility that is also suggested by recent evidence that business interests tend to be less successful 
in shaping EU legislation than non-business actors (Dür et al. 2015). We control for group type using 
a dummy variable that is coded 1 for business interests and 0 for other types (business). 
 
We estimate a linear model with random intercepts at the proposal and issue levels. The random 
intercepts account for the nested nature of the observations: several actors lobby on the same issue, 
which are in turn bundled within proposals. This enables us to control for any remaining but 
unobserved issue and proposal-level factors shaping policy actors’ success. Because of missing 
values for some covariates, the number of observations varies slightly across models. 
 
RESULTS 
To assess these expectations, we first estimate a model containing all covariates, but no interaction 
terms (Model 1 in Table 1). According to Hypothesis 1a we expect the distance between an actor’s 
position and the position of the lead DG to be smaller, the more information the actor has about an 
issue. The coefficient for IG knowledge is indeed negative and statistically significant. Hypothesis 2a 
states that actors facing a friendly DG should be closer to the Commission position than other actors. 
Model 1 does not support this expectation: the coefficient for friendly DG is not statistically different 
from zero. Of the control variables, the coefficient for regulation is positive and weakly statistically 
significant. On regulations, interest groups find themselves further away from the Commission 
position than on directives. The positive and strongly statistically significant coefficient for side is 
unexpected, as a larger number of actors on a side is associated with greater distance from the 
Commission position.12 The amount of media attention is not associated with lobbyists’ distance to 
the Commission. By contrast, the coefficient for business is positive and statistically significant, 
confirming previous research reporting a lack of business success in the EU (Dür et al. 2015).  
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In Model 2 (Table 1) we analyse ‘lobbying as a collective enterprise’ (Klüver 2013b) using the 
lobbying side variables outlined above (IG knowledge (side) and friendly DG (side)). In this model, 
the coefficient for IG knowledge (side) is negative and statistically significant. As a side’s knowledge 
score increases by one point, an actor within that side can expect to be more than seven points closer 
to the Commission. Model 2 thus supports Hypothesis 1b. However, analogous to the analysis of 
individual actors’ relationship with the Commission’s policy units, we do not find support for 
Hypothesis 2b: a greater share of actors facing a friendly DG does not move the Commission closer 
to that side. The coefficients for the control variables are very similar to those that we estimated in 
Model 1. So far, the evidence supports Hypothesis 1a and 1b but fails to back Hypotheses 2a or 2b. 
 
In Model 3, we investigate the interaction between IG knowledge and friendly DG. Hypothesis 3a 
states that relevant knowledge is particularly useful to actors facing a friendly DG. As expected, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. Knowledge is not 
statistically significant in this model (because of the interaction term, this is the effect of knowledge 
when a group does not face a friendly DG), and facing a friendly DG is associated with a larger 
distance between the lobbyist and the Commission (which is the effect when IG knowledge is zero). 
To facilitate interpretation, Figure 2 shows graphically how the effect of IG knowledge on distance is 
conditional on the institutional context: while actors that face a friendly DG benefit from increased 
informational capacities, actors lobbying a non-friendly DG do not. Surprisingly, at low levels of 
information capabilities, the Commission is closer to non-friendly interest groups than to friendly 
groups (the effect is weakly statistically significant). For actors with excellent information 
capabilities, those facing a friendly DG find themselves closer to the Commission’s position than 
15 
 
those facing a non-friendly DG, but the difference between the two groups is not statistically 
significant. Thus, the evidence so far entails partial backing for Hypothesis 3a. 
 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
In Model 4 we include an interaction term for IG knowledge (side) and friendly DG (side) to test 
Hypothesis 3b. Similar to Model 3, the coefficient for this term is negative and statistically highly 
significant. Figure 3 shows this effect graphically. While friendly DG (side) is a continuous variable, 
we only show the results for instances in which this variable takes its extreme values (0 and 100), 
that is, when either no group on a side faces a friendly DG or all actors on that side face a friendly 
DG. Actors whose sides face a friendly DG strongly benefit from more information. While for actors 
that do not face a friendly DG the line of prediction also has a slightly negative slope, the coefficient 
is very small and not significant. Again, however, the fact that at low levels of information 
capability, the Commission’s position is further away from actors whose side faces a friendly DG 
than from actors whose side faces a non-friendly DG is puzzling. Model 4 thus supports the 
expectation that knowledge matters more when applied in a friendly institutional context, but it still 
offers only partial backing for Hypothesis 3b.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Overall, we find that the ability to provide technical knowledge is effective in narrowing the gap 
between the policy positons of the lobbyist and the policy-maker (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). By 
contrast, friendly relations between a lobbyist (the lobbyist’s side) and a policy-maker do not matter 
for the position that the policy-maker adopts on an issue (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). We also find that 
the effect of information is moderated by the relationship between interest groups and a policy-
maker. Information only matters for groups facing a friendly policy-maker (Hypotheses 3a and 3b).  
16 
 
 
In operationalizing our research problem we made several decisions about measurement and 
estimation strategy that might affect our findings. To check whether they do, we conduct further 
robustness analyses in which we estimate similar models as those reported in Table 1 but apply 
alternative measurement and estimation options. In Models 2 and 4 of Table 1, we operationalized IG 
knowledge (side) by taking the maximum value for IG knowledge observed for each side. However, 
it is possible that the Commission actually listens to the side that provides the best information on 
average. We take account of this possibility by calculating an alternative IG knowledge (side) 
variable that takes the mean on IG knowledge for each side. Using this variable instead of the one 
used in Models 2 and 4 does not affect our results. Neither does operationalizing sides with fixed cut-
off points (0-20, 21-79, and 80-100) change our substantive findings. Full details are reported in 
Table A-2 in the online appendix. 
 
Furthermore, we assess whether our results are robust to changes in estimation strategy. While we 
have so far relied on linear regression with random intercepts, this estimator tends to discount the 
large number of 0s and 100s in our dependent variable. To see whether our results are sensitive to the 
approach to analyzing the data, we convert the dependent variable into an ordinal variable taking on 
the values 0 (distance from 0 to 10), 1 (distance greater than 10 but smaller than 60) and 2 (distance 
60 or larger) and estimate the models using ordinal logistic regression (Table A-3). As before, these 
models include random intercepts at the proposal and issue levels. The results fully support the 
substantive findings reported above.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Following informational theories of lobbying (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith 1993; Lohmann 
1993), we have argued in this article that the positions of policy-makers should be closer to those of 
lobbyists (or sides of lobbyists) that avail of large amounts of policy-relevant information. Taking 
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into account insights from research on policy communities (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Marsh 
1998) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), we also expected policy-makers to 
be closer to lobbyists (or sides of lobbyists) with whom they entertain friendly relations and share 
common beliefs. Finally, we combined the two arguments by proposing that the effect of policy-
relevant information is particularly effective if the relationship between the policy-maker and the 
lobbyist (or side of lobbyists) is situated in a friendly institutional context.  
 
Examining these expectations using data on policy formulation and lobbying in the EU, we found 
support for the argument that the amount of relevant knowledge a lobbyist or her side is able to bring 
to the policy process accounts for some of the proximity of positions between the European 
Commission and lobbyists. By contrast, the presence of a friendly institutional context on its own 
does not have an impact on the policies that the agenda setter formulates. Rather, our analysis 
suggests that the institutional context moderates the effect of informational resources: information 
matters for groups facing a friendly DG.  Overall, therefore, the evidence presented in this paper 
backs informational theories of lobbying, while lending only qualified support to theories 
emphasizing the contextual nature of policy formulation. At the same time, the fact that context 
moderates the effect of information suggests that who you know might only be important inasmuch as 
it provides a lobbyist with the opportunity for applying what you know in the policy process. 
Bringing knowledge to bear on policy formulation is facilitated by favourable contexts. The effect of 
policy-relevant technical knowledge under these circumstances is that the positions of the policy-
maker and the lobbyist are closer to one another than they would otherwise be. In this sense, the data 
tell us which lobbyists are more successful in the context of early stage lobbying than others: those 
with high levels of relevant knowledge who also enjoy favourable relationships with the 
Commission’s policy units.  
 
18 
 
An unexpected finding of this research is the fact that, at low levels of lobbyists’ informational 
resources, the Commission’s position is further away from actors whose side faces a friendly DG 
than from actors whose side faces a non-friendly DG. This suggests that the Commission discounts 
lobbying by actors sharing its political beliefs while accommodating others. While exploring the 
reasons for this is beyond the scope of the present article, it may be possible that Commission staff 
discount the positions of lobbyists within their policy community to avoid the impression of catering 
to their friends’ interests. As a result, the Commission formulates policy proposals which friendly 
interest organisations support only if these organisations provide high quality information. 
Alternatively, groups that have a friendly relationship with the Commission may not bother to 
become active on a Commission proposal that is close to their preferences. This would imply that we 
have overestimated the average distance between the Commission and friendly groups. Future 
research should probe further into these lines of inquiry. 
 
We close on a note of caution: We have developed and tested arguments explaining the positional 
proximity between lobbyists and policy-makers. However, the successful early-stage lobbyists in our 
analysis were not necessarily influential in shaping the Commission’s policy position: Proximity per 
se does not necessarily imply ‘influence’. Influential actors are able to place their preferred policy 
proposals on the official agenda while averting proposals that they dislike, and the prevalence of 
these proposals depends on the actions or some properties of the influential actor. In the research 
presented here, we cannot rule out that lobbyists find their positions closely matched by the policy-
maker due to ‘luck’ rather than influence (cf. Barry, 1980). However, while individual policy actors 
might occasionally be lucky, if luck was all that matters we should not observe statistically 
significant associations between positional proximity and the variables that, as we have argued, serve 
to explain some of this proximity. Moreover, it is possible that knowledgeable lobbyists benefit from 
friendly DGs because these DGs aim to bolster the case for their policy positions with information 
supplied by the respective lobbyists or because they seek to envelop their policy proposals in claims 
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of legitimacy based on consultations with relevant organized interests. Future research should aim to 
disentangle the strategic behaviour and causal relationships underlying these observationally 
equivalent interpretations.  
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Figure 1: Positional distance between Commission and lobbyist, by DG 
  Note: the horizontal bars indicate the standard error of the mean. The numbers to the right refer to the number of 
proposals for each DG in our dataset. 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction of interest group knowledge and friendly DG 
 
 Note: Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. The predictions and confidence intervals are calculated while keeping 
other covariates at the mean and business at the mode. 
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Figure 3: Interaction of interest group knowledge (side) and friendly DG (side) 
 Note: Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. The predictions and confidence intervals are calculated while keeping 
other covariates at the mean and business at the mode. 
 
Table 1: Multivariate regression models of Distance to Commission 
 Model 1 
(individual) 
Model 2 
(side) 
Model 3 
(individual) 
Model 4 
(side) 
IG knowledge -2.18** 
(1.06) 
 
 
0.25 
(1.36) 
 
 
Friendly DG -1.40 
(2.86) 
 
 
14.94** 
(6.35) 
 
 
IG knowledge * 
Friendly DG 
 
 
 
 
-5.59*** 
(1.94) 
 
 
IG knowledge (side)  
 
-7.57*** 
(1.58) 
 
 
-2.76 
(2.00) 
Friendly DG (side)  
 
2.62 
(3.22) 
 
 
42.74*** 
(10.70) 
IG knowledge (side) 
* Friendly DG (side 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-11.85*** 
(3.02) 
Regulation 9.45* 
(5.53) 
11.11** 
(5.58) 
10.03* 
(5.63) 
12.43** 
(5.84) 
Side 1.74*** 
(0.40) 
2.48*** 
(0.41) 
1.82*** 
(0.40) 
2.57*** 
(0.41) 
Media (logged) 0.66 
(3.09) 
0.48 
(3.12) 
0.80 
(3.14) 
0.87 
(3.26) 
Business 15.62*** 
(2.86) 
11.13*** 
(2.45) 
16.16*** 
(2.85) 
11.79*** 
(2.44) 
Intercept 29.84*** 
(8.91) 
46.71*** 
(9.68) 
21.56** 
(9.46) 
27.81** 
(11.06) 
Observations 929 985 929 985 
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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1 Our definition of ‘side’ is similar to Klüver’s (2013) concept of a ‘coalition’. It differs from the similarly named 
concept of ‘side’ used by Baumgartner et al. (2009) because, unlike Baumgartner et al., we only include non-state actors 
in the set of actors making up a side. Our definition differs from the ‘sides’ used by Heinz et al. (1993) inasmuch as their 
sides are either for or against a legislative proposal, whereas in our analysis sides cover an interval of positions on a 
unidimensional issue space. 
2 For an overview of the project, see Beyers et al. 2014a. 
3 Beyers et al. (2014b) provide a more detailed discussion of the sampling process. 
4 Of the remaining proposals in the original sample, officials reported that no lobbying had taken place in 26 cases, and 
declined our requests for an interview in a further 29 instances. These cases were excluded from further analysis. 
5 Our definition of a policy issue thus corresponds to Baumgartner et al. (2009: 277), who took ‘whatever the respondent 
described’ as an issue. The challenges involved in interviewing policy experts are discussed in detail in (Beyers et al. 
(2014c). 
6 Some groups are counted several times as they lobbied on several issues. In total, we identified 501 unique actors.  
7 See Figure A-1 in the online appendix. Below, we name the DGs in accordance with the 2004-9 Commission (Barroso 
I), which encompasses the bulk of our observations. In 2010 both DG Justice, Freedom and Security and DG Energy and 
Transport were split in two. To facilitate comparability, we maintained the original coding. As the successor DGs would 
have been coded identically on their relation to the various interest groups, this does not affect our results in any way.  
8 Figure A-2 in the online appendix shows the distribution of distance to the Commission. 
9 Given this distinction between friendly and less friendly relations between interest groups and DGs, there is a 
possibility that Commission experts’ rating of lobbyists’ knowledge levels may be biased. However, the respective mean 
knowledge scores for groups defined in this way are hardly different: 3.07 for lobbyists acting in a friendly context and 
2.91 others. 
10 In a small number of cases, consultations began during the 2009-2014 Commission (Barroso II). For the reasons 
outlined above in footnote 7, resulting changes to the identity of DGs make no difference to the coding outcome. 
11 Put differently, nearly two thirds of the business actors in our dataset face a friendly DG while only 14 per cent of other 
actors do. 
12 An explanation for this finding may be that groups with preferences far from the Commission’s position may feel a 
particularly large need to engage in lobbying. 
                                                            
